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Abstract
This paper analyses the monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area through the
use of large scale macroeconomic models at the disposal of the European Central Bank and
the National Central Banks of the Eurosystem. The results reported are based on a carefully
designed common simulation experiment involving a 100 basis point rise in the policy
interest rate for two years accompanied by common assumptions regarding the path of long-
term interest rates and the exchange rate. Aggregating the country level results, the fall in
output is found to reach a maximum of 0.4 per cent after 2 years. The maximum aggregate
fall in prices is also 0.4 per cent, but it occurs 2 years later. The dominant channel of
transmission in the first two years is the exchange rate channel, but in terms of the impact on
output, the user cost of capital channel becomes dominant from the third year of the
simulation onwards.
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1
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the monetary transmission mechanism in the
euro area through the use of large scale macroeconomic models at the disposal of the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the Eurosystem. A
wide range of tools are used for economic analysis in both the ECB and NCBs which play an
important role in forecasting and providing policy advice. In view of the adoption of
monetary union, it is timely to re-examine the properties of these models in a systematic way
and this exercise is a first step in this direction. The results reported in this paper are the fruit
of co-operation within the Working Group on Econometric Modelling (WGEM) and are
based on a carefully designed common simulation experiment.
Analysing whether the countries of the euro area behave similarly in the face of a
monetary policy action is not purely a theoretical curiosity, but has become, with the launch
of the euro, a crucial issue for appraising the challenges of running a single monetary policy.
As stressed in Guiso et al. (1999), there are a few conditions which must be met for a single
policy to succeed without causing frictions among the members of the coalition: first, there
must be a general agreement on the ultimate goals the monetary authority has to achieve;
second, member countries’ business cycles should be as aligned as possible; finally, the
transmission mechanism should operate in a similar fashion within the currency area.
Differences in the response to a policy stimulus, whether caused by asymmetries in the
business cycle or in the transmission mechanism, will imply that the burden of adjustment is
not equally shared across countries and may create political tension which, in the extreme,
may even jeopardise the mutual sharing of the goals underlying the creation of the monetary
union.
The last major study of comparative properties of central bank models in terms of
monetary transmission was carried out by the BIS in 1994 (BIS, 1995). The present study
                                                          
1 The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions to
which they are affiliated. The authors are grateful to the members of the Working Group of Econometric
Modelling for the use of their results in this paper and for their helpful comments, whilst retaining
responsibility for all errors.8
has important similarities with, and differences from, this earlier study. The BIS (1995)
study looked for cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy and examined the extent to which these could be linked to differences in financial
structure. An important element of this study was a comparison of a monetary experiment
undertaken using large-scale macroeconomic models developed by national central banks
and the Multi-Country Macroeconomic (MCM) model of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve. The experiment involved a one percentage point increase in the policy
interest rate for 2 years and the results were summarised  by Smets (1995).
There are a number of important reasons why it is timely to re-examine the
transmission mechanism on the basis of properties of central bank models rather than relying
on BIS results. First, there is evidence that the monetary transmission mechanism may
change considerably even in a short period of time. Taylor (1995) provides some evidence
that in the US, Japan and Germany the impact of a monetary policy action has changed with
respect to the 1970s.
2 Galì et al. (2000) compare the pre-Volcker and the Volcker-Greenspan
period and detect significant differences in the response of the economy as well as the US
Federal Reserve to technology shocks. In a recent paper, Boivin and Giannoni (2001) have
tried to assess on quantitative grounds whether the way in which monetary policy impulses
are transmitted has changed in the last two decades. Their main finding is that monetary
policy, by becoming more aggressive, has contributed to reduced output and inflation
variability, while changes in the transmission mechanism, in other words the structure of the
economy, have generated a more rapid response of the endogenous variables to monetary
policy shocks. Evidence for the euro area is more thin on the ground, but it is clearly likely
that the regime switch which has occurred with the creation of the ECB means that past
studies of the monetary policy transmission – based on differing interest and exchange rate
assumptions for individual euro area countries - are now of only limited relevance.
Second, the previous results are now a little dated as the models have evolved since the
exercise, reflecting new approaches, the availability of new data, and possibly changes in
                                                          
2 Taylor (1995) finds that “a comparison of […] two sets of estimates [one from the early 1970s trough the
mid-1980s and the other through the mid-1990s] gives a sense of the magnitude of change in the monetary
transmission mechanism over time. In the United States, the interest rate elasticity of investment has declined,
but the interest rate elasticity of consumption has increased. ”.9
financial structures and institutions. Moreover, new models have become available and it has
become possible to undertake this experiment for all 12 members of the euro area rather than
the 8 EU countries included in the BIS exercise. Another new model which can now be used
in such an exercise is the ECB’s Area Wide Model (AWM) which is a model of the
aggregate euro area economy (as detailed in Fagan et al. (2001)).
Third, although the aim was to undertake a comparable simulation across countries in
the BIS exercise, there were nonetheless important differences in the nature of the
simulations undertaken by the respective central banks. Since the research was conducted
when macroeconomic convergence among the member states of the euro area was still to be
achieved, interest rates differed between countries. In the presence of non-linearities,
imposing the same 100 basis point shock to all the models translated into an impulse of
different magnitude hitting each of the (future) euro area economies, depending on the level
of the interest rates in the baseline simulation.
3 Another important difference was that some
central banks undertook the simulations with fixed intra-European exchange rates whilst
others allowed these exchange rates to vary as a result of the change in monetary policy.
Even for those countries which did adopt fixed exchange rates (with ERM countries) there
was not a consistent movement in the exchange rates with third party currencies. These
points are perhaps not surprising as the composition of the euro area was not yet known in
1995. However, it significantly affects the comparability of the results for the euro area
countries and limits their usefulness in the current environment of monetary union. More
fundamentally, it is inappropriate for euro area as there is a need to have a fully consistent
treatment of the exchange rate. A similar argument applies with respect to the treatment of
long-term interest rates since, in the BIS exercise, the response pattern of long-term interest
rates reflected the NCB’s model equation explaining the representative long-term rate.
                                                          
3 This applies especially as regards the impact on income and also depends on whether the agents are net
creditors or net debtors – and by what amount – when the shock occurs. In addition, a number of countries have
adopted various measures of financial deregulation, at various times. Hence, country by country, depending on
when the shock is simulated, the outcome may be different and not necessarily representative of the situation
prevailing today. To avoid these drawbacks and in order to simulate the shock over a long enough period of
time, it has been decided to simulate it out of sample under a set of common assumptions. The exact definition
of the baseline is revisited in detail below.10
This point leads to one of the key aspects of this study – namely the consistency of the
experiment undertaken on the models. Considerable attention was paid to undertaking a
genuinely comparable monetary policy experiment on all models that reflects the realities of
monetary union in the euro area. The details of the exercise were agreed at various meetings
of the WGEM, held in the latter half of 2000 and the first half of 2001. In essence, the aim
was to take the BIS experiment as a starting point, but to go beyond this and agree details on
questions such as the use of monetary and fiscal policy rules and the path of the exchange
rate and long-term interest rates.
Another important issue which is addressed in this paper is that of intra-euro area
spillover effects from the exercise. Unlike the BIS (1995) study, the exercise on national
models is conducted on the basis that the change in monetary policy has taken place
simultaneously in all euro area countries. In the BIS (1995) study the exercise was conducted
in isolation in each of the NCB’s models (although such spillover effects were clearly
captured in the MCM).
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section a general discussion of the
views on the monetary policy transmission process in the literature provides a frame of
reference to the present exercise. Next, details are provided on the way in which monetary
policy enters the models used in the exercise. Following this there is a discussion of the
design of the monetary policy experiment and the motivation for the simulation that was
chosen. Next there is a discussion of the method chosen for decomposing the monetary
transmission process into channels. Finally there is a discussion of the results including the
decomposition into channels and some comparison with the 1994/1995 BIS results.
2. Channels of transmission
There is a long list of comprehensive surveys of the monetary transmission process
available in the literature. A few notable contributions in this area are by Cecchetti (1995),
Mishkin (1996), and Christiano et al. (1997), although this is by no means an exhaustive list.
Whilst a general consensus on the monetary transmission mechanism has not emerged from
this work, there are a few elements that are common to all the theories which try to explain
how monetary impulses affect the economy. The first concerns the ability of the central bank11
to control the supply of an asset, “outside money”, that is demanded by financial institutions
and for which no perfect substitute exists. By engaging in open market operations, the
monetary authority affects the liquidity of the banking system and the interest rate on
reserves and in so doing changes the prices on a variety of domestic and foreign assets. The
second common element relates to the existence of nominal rigidities - either in the labour
and goods markets or in the financial sector – which prevent the price level from fully
adjusting in the short-run. A few sources of nominal rigidities have been proposed in the
literature: sticky prices, sticky wages and imperfections which limit the ability of households
to participate in financial markets. Theories relying on such stickiness exploit the idea that
nominal rigidities arise because of the existence of fixed costs in changing prices and wages,
which makes it sub-optimal for firms and workers to continuously respond to changes in the
economic environment. In the financial sector, limited participation models, instead, assume
that, while prices are perfectly flexible, households are unable to immediately adjust their
nominal saving in response to financial shocks and for this reason monetary contractions
disproportionately affect the reserves of banks and hence the supply of loanable funds. The
result is a rise in interest rates which induces firms who need working capital to cut back on
their scale of operations.
Though all theories of the monetary transmission mechanism share the view that
central banks can control money market real interest rates, there is less agreement on the
process through which a change in the monetary policy stance affects households’ and firms’
behaviour.
The traditional view 
4 suggests that monetary policymakers use their leverage over
short-term interest rates to influence a host of asset prices, in particular longer term interest
rates and the exchange rate. The ensuing change in interest rates is then transmitted to the
real cost of capital, so altering the optimal capital-output ratio and investment. A similar
mechanism, although somewhat simplified, operates for investment in housing and
structures and for the accumulation of inventories. In addition, changes in interest rates
affect the rental cost of durable goods and the relative price of present as opposed to future
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consumption, thereby affecting consumer spending. Since in the short-run production is
demand driven, the response of “interest-sensitive” components of aggregate demand
changes the output and unemployment gaps and induces adjustments in wages and prices,
which feed back to the spending decisions of firms and households until a new equilibrium is
reached. The exchange rate provides additional leverage to the policy maker. A monetary
tightening appreciates the exchange rate, affecting prices directly via the import deflator and
indirectly via a fall in net exports caused by the loss in competitiveness.
As stressed in Cecchetti (1999), a noteworthy implication of the traditional view,
which attributes a pivotal role to the response of investment demand, is that a more
restrictive monetary policy stance hits only those projects which are the least productive (i.e.
those with the lowest rate of return). Given that a decline in the capital stock and output is
required in order to curb inflationary pressures, the allocation of the decline across sectors is
at least socially efficient. Externalities and financial market imperfections play no role in the
transmission mechanism and this marks the starkest difference with the basic insight of the
credit channel theory.
5
Two stylised facts appear to be at variance with the traditional view of the monetary
transmission mechanism, namely the low elasticity of the cost-of-capital in estimated
spending equations
6 and the high degree of amplification, i.e. the empirical evidence that
though central bank’s actions induce relatively small and transitory movements in open
market interest rates, nevertheless they have large and persistent effects on the purchase of
long-lived assets, such as housing or production equipment. According to the lending view,
theory and evidence can be reconciled by focusing on those frictions - such as imperfect
information or costly enforcement of contracts - which interfere with the smooth functioning
of financial markets and which drive a wedge between the expected return received by
lenders and the costs faced by potential borrowers, the so-called external finance premium.
Advocates of the credit channel claim that monetary policy affects not only the general level
of interest rates, but also the size of the external finance premium. It is this additional
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6 Taylor (1995) rejects this criticism and claims that, on the contrary, econometric evidence is supportive of
the existence of a sizeable response of domestic demand components to interest rate movements.13
element which helps explain the strength, timing and composition of a monetary impulse.
The link between monetary policy and the external finance premium passes through
borrowers’ net worth and the supply of bank loans. By reducing expected future sales and by
increasing the cost of rolling over outstanding debt, a policy tightening causes a deterioration
in the firm’s net worth. As the latter declines, the deadweight costs associated with the
principal-agent problem rise,
7 an outcome that will lead potential lenders to increase the risk
premium they require. The initial monetary impulse is further magnified by the contraction
in bank reserves, which must be matched by a reduction in the level of both deposits and
loans. If there are firms (or households) without an alternative source of financing, spending
must be curtailed.
A third view of the monetary transmission mechanism, which has only recently
received some attention and which is described in Christiano et al. (1997) and Barth and
Ramey (2001), stresses the relevance of supply factors. Since firms must pay their factors of
production before they receive revenues from sales, they must raise the required funds by
borrowing. An increase in interest rates is therefore associated with a downward shift in the
labour demand schedule, similar to a negative productivity shock, and leads to higher
production costs and to a decline in output which is driven by supply-side factors.
8
According to its advocates, this approach can potentially explain a few empirical puzzles
which do not square well with the traditional view. The first is the aforementioned degree of
amplification. If monetary policy shocks exert both demand-side and supply-side effects,
then the additional leverage provided by the latter may help explaining the amplification
mechanism. The second one is the well known “price puzzle” when a short-run increase in
the price level is observed following a monetary contraction. If a more restrictive stance
affects only aggregate demand, no reasonable explanation for such a phenomenon exists; if
instead it also generates a rise in production costs, then an initial apparently perverse
reaction of inflation may appear, to the extent that the increase in production cost is not
                                                          
7 The usual explanation goes as follows: the higher the net worth, the higher the stake of the firm’s projects
which is self-financed and/or the higher the share of debt which is collateralized. Both outcomes favour a
reduction in the external finance premium.
8 The assumption in these models is that prices are not sticky but adjust immediately to changes in marginal
costs. The source of nominal rigidities is found in capital market imperfections, which limit the participation of
households.14
offset by a procyclical reduction in the mark-up. While the former induces a fall in
productivity and real wages, consistently with a worsening of production possibilities that
leads to a downward shift in labour demand, the latter engender a rise in both variables,
consistently with a stable production function. The third and final one is the differing
responses of key macroeconomic variables after a rise in interest rates compared with other
shifts to aggregate demand
Notwithstanding the distinguishing features of the three approaches, they are in fact
not inconsistent with each other. As stressed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the credit
channel is not to be thought as a distinct, free-standing alternative to the traditional monetary
transmission process, but rather an enhancement mechanism, which contributes to
amplifying and propagating conventional interest rate effects. The same consideration
applies to the cost channel, where supply-side factors are to be seen as powerful
collaborators in the transmission of the real, short-run effects of monetary policy changes.
The traditional view, being based exclusively on macro relationships, is better suited
for econometric modelling. The lending view, which stresses the role of asymmetric
information in determining the size of the external finance premium, treats large and small
firms differently, and, within the financial sector, distinguishes between healthy and
unhealthy banks. The cost channel, instead, requires that firms adjust their prices
immediately after a monetary policy action, which contrasts with the observed stickiness in
the pricing behaviour of the corporate sector.
9 The models used in the WGEM Monetary
Transmission Exercise are no exception and tend to model the monetary transmission
mechanism by focusing on the response of interest-sensitive components of aggregate
spending and on the amplification process generated by the multiplier and the accelerator
principles.
10
                                                          
9 For monetary policy to have real effects, some nominal rigidities must exist. The cost channel usually
relies on frictions limiting households’ participation to capital markets. In principle, price stickiness would do
as well, but it is unlikely that the cost channel may explain a significant part of the effects of a monetary policy
shock if prices are not free to fluctuate.
10 In a few cases attempts have been made to adopt a more eclectic view and to combine the features of
three different approaches. For instance, the models of the National Banks of Belgium and Holland relate the
main price variable not only to unit labour costs but also to the cost of capital, so allowing for a direct effect of
monetary policy on inflation, as suggested by the cost channel theory; furthermore, the Nederlandsche Bank’s15
The transmission of monetary policy impulses may be described as developing in three
phases. First, a change in the policy instrument is transmitted to the whole set of interest
rates and exchange rates. Second, the movements in financial prices interact with the
spending behaviour of households and firms. Third, the ensuing change in the output and
unemployment gaps induces wages and prices to adjust to restore a new equilibrium. The
changes in prices and quantities feed back into the financial system, inducing modifications
in the composition of balance sheets which may exert second round effects on interest rates,
thus setting the stage for the interaction between the real and the financial side of the model.
The process through which interest rates affect the aggregate demand – the second phase –
can be, somewhat arbitrarily, grouped into transmission channels, which tend to single out
one at a time the components of aggregate spending which are affected by the policy action
and the processes which drive these shifts. In the WGEM Monetary Transmission Exercise
five channels have been identified, which are present in most of the participating models:
11
•  The exchange rate channel – in most models of exchange rate determination, a monetary
policy tightening appreciates the currency. A stronger exchange rate exerts a widespread
influence on both the real and the financial side of the economy. It causes a fall in
exports, partially compensated by the parallel contraction in import volumes via the
multiplier effect, and an increase in consumer spending, induced by the positive income
effect which follows an appreciation. It also yields a fall in the price level, directly since
it reduces the cost of imported goods and the size of the mark-up and indirectly since it
worsens the competitive position of domestic firms and hence net exports.
•  The substitution-effect-in-consumption channel – the real interest rate represents the
relative cost of present versus future consumption. Following a policy tightening, it
                                                                                                                                                                                  
model includes among the determinants of capital accumulation a measure of profitability, which can be
viewed as a proxy for firms’ net worth, capturing, in accordance with the lending view, the influence of capital
market frictions on the monetary transmission mechanism. A previous version of the quarterly model of the
Bank of Italy allowed credit conditions to influence the monetary mechanism by making the spread between
the loan rate and rates on Treasury securities a function of the degree of liquidity of banks’ balance sheets. This
variable is however disappeared, since with the most recent vintages of data it turned out statistically
insignificant.
11 In some models, additional channels are singled out: a price-monetary channel is included in the one of
the Bundesbank; an expectation channel is present in the Italian model.16
becomes more rewarding to delay consumption and increase saving, which exerts a
negative impulse on the current level of economic activity.
•  The cost-of-capital channel – the rise in the real interest rate is reflected in the real cost
of capital. The optimal capital-output ratio falls and the pace of capital accumulation
slows down accordingly. A similar mechanism operates for investment in housing and
structures and for inventories accumulation. The rental cost of durable goods moves in
parallel with the cost of capital and also causes a contraction in consumer spending.
12
•  The income and cash-flow channel – a rise in financial yields increases the disposable
income of net lenders and worsens the cash flows of net borrowers. The effects are
stronger the higher the portfolio share of short-term and floating rate securities. The
relevance of the cash-flow channel is strictly linked to the financial structure of the
economy and depends also on the relative propensity to spend of borrowers and lenders.
•  The wealth channel – a deterioration in borrowing conditions reduces the discounted
value of future expected payoffs of physical and financial assets. The market value of
households’ net wealth adjusts to incorporate capital losses, constraining the opportunity
set of consumers, and household spending falls accordingly.
3. The structures and main features of the models used
This section gives a brief overview of how changes in monetary policy affect the
models used in the exercise. The aim here is to give an overview rather than discuss the
transmission mechanism in the models in detail. Where important features of the models can
help explain differences in the results observed in the monetary policy experiment, these are
highlighted in the results section of the paper.
                                                          
12 Since most econometric models used in the experiment do not distinguish between consumption of
durables and non-durables, to allow comparisons the response to the monetary policy shock of durables
spending has been allocated not to the cost-of-capital channel but to the substitution-effect channel.17
Table 3.1   Conventional channels of monetary transmission in ESCB models














P: Channel present; S: Channel present but has special feature; N: Channel not present
Table 3.1 provides an overview on which of the channels of monetary policy
transmission discussed in the previous section are present in each of the models. The
exchange rate channel exists in all models. It directly feeds into the euro-price of oil and
other commodities (involving the euro-dollar exchange rate) and the foreign prices of other
goods and services (involving the effective exchange rates). The change in import and
competitors’ prices in euros initiates a change in domestic prices, which will spread through
the price and wage system. Therefore competitiveness and real wages are affected at least in
the short and medium term. There is some heterogeneity in the treatment of the exchange
rate across models, so in order to ensure an identical exchange rate path across the euro area
it was necessary to agree a common path for the exchange rate as discussed in the next
section.
The substitution-effect-in-consumption channel (henceforth: substitution channel) also
exists in all models, but the distinction between this channel and the income channel cannot
be made very precisely in the case of Belgium. Table 3.2 gives more details on the interest
rate effects on consumers’ expenditure. In the Irish case and in the AWM, real short-term
rates affect short-run consumption and there are also direct interest rate effects on
consumption in Portugal and Greece. In the German model and in the Netherlands’ model,
the long-term interest rate influences real consumption per capita. In Italy, Austria and18
Finland bank lending rates affect consumer spending. Moreover, in the Italian case a
distinction between durables and non-durables is made.
The cost-of-capital channel is present in all models. However, there are differences
between the various models in the way this channel is incorporated.  As Table 3.2 reveals,
interest rates – generally long term – can affect investment in all the models, although there
are differences in the mechanism. In many cases the link between interest rates and business
investment is via the capital stock. A change in interest rates affects the user costs of capital,
which affects the desired capital stock and thereby investment. Because of adjustment costs,
investment can only gradually bring the actual capital stock to its desired level.
The user cost of capital variable is designed to reflect long-term borrowing costs. For
example, in the Irish model, long-term interest rates and corporate borrowing costs are used
to construct a measure of the cost of capital which determines the optimal capital stock. In
the Portuguese model, the user cost of capital is the average of the long term interest rate and
the credit interest rate. In the Finnish model, interest rates affect investment through the
rental price of capital – this is disaggregated into four categories of investment. In this case
long-term interest rates do not play any role as the expected short-term interest rate is
implicitly taken into account in the structure of the equations. In the German model there is a
direct link between long-term interest rates and real machinery and equipment investment
and an indirect link through the impact of the user cost of capital on the present value of
depreciation allowances. In the Netherlands model, non-residential investment depends on a
weighted average of short- and long-term interest rates and on the profitability of investment
expressed as the after-tax yield on capital.Table 3.2: Direct Interest Rate Effects in Private Investment and Consumption
Private Investment Private Consumption
AWM Effect via cost of capital term which is
the short-term real interest rate.
Real short-term interest rates affect
short-run consumption.
Germany Direct effect of long-term interest rates
and indirect influence through long-
term rate’s effect on the present value
of depreciation allowances and on the
user costs of machinery and equipment,
which affects the investment deflator.
Long rate affects real consumption
per capita.
Greece Effect via a user cost of capital term Direct interest rate effect.
Spain Real user cost of capital (long rate) Real long-term interest rate
France Both the short and the long term
interest rate play a role but through the
cash-flow effect only.
Direct real short term interest rate
effect
Ireland Effect via cost of capital term which is
the long-term interest rate and
corporate borrowing costs.
Real short-term interest rates effect
short-run consumption.
Italy Equipment investment depends on the
cost of capital, which is defined in
terms of a convex combination of the
yield of Treasury bonds (long-term
rate) and the average loan rate
(averaged over short and long
maturities). Investment in structures
depends  on the average loan rate.
Residential investment is a function of
the short-term loan rate.
Durables consumption depends on
the interest rate on short-term loans,
while non-durables consumption is
affected by a longer-term interest rate
(Treasury bond yield).
Luxembourg Cost of capital term combining short
and long term interest rate
Real long-term interest rate
Netherlands Weighted average of short and long-
rates.
Long-term interest rate
Austria Direct effect of bank lending rate Direct effect of the bank lending rate
Portugal Effect via cost of capital term which is
the average of a short and long term
interest rate.
Direct effect of real short-term
interest rate.
Finland Effect via cost the rental price of
capital which is affected by the short-
term interest rate.
Direct effect of the bank lending rate.20
Residential investment in the Netherlands depends on long-term interest rates, as
households tend to favour long-term mortgages for financing the cost of building new houses
or renovating existing houses. The combined cash flow/income channel exists in all models
except those for Greece and Ireland. As noted before, the impact of this channel will depend
on the financial position of households and firms at the time of the policy action. In the case
of the Netherlands the income channel includes the effects of portfolio reallocation by
households and firms.
13
The wealth channel is not present in the models for Germany, Greece, Spain, France,
and Portugal. Changes in wealth are caused by (cumulated) changes in asset holdings (M3,
bonds, shares, and net foreign assets) as well as by valuation effects. As to the latter, asset
prices are endogenous in the models for Austria (shares), Finland (house prices) and
Netherlands (house, share and bond prices). In the models for Finland and Netherlands
wealth not only affects consumption directly but also residential investment through changes
in house prices.
Finally, there are a number of country-specific channels that are not shown in the table.
In the German model there is separate monetary channel which transmits interest rate
impulses to inflation via the price gap, i.e. the deviation of the actual price level from the
equilibrium price level P-star. This channel, which is absent in other country models,
accounts for the empirical observation that inflation in the long run is a monetary
phenomenon. A rise in interest rates leads to a reduction in the monetary aggregate M3 and
P-star, thereby leading to a fall in prices. More details of the operation of this channel are
provided in the box. In the case of Italy two additional channels are operating: (1) the
expectations channel capturing the direct impact of changes in policy controlled interest rates
on inflation expectations, and (2) the portfolio channel which includes the effects of portfolio
reallocation by households and firms. The latter channel is also present in the Netherlands’
model but there it is included in the joint income/cash flow channel. An inflation channel
also plays a role in explaining the dynamics of consumption in the case of France (Pigou-
effect), but has not been isolated as a separate channel in the present exercise.
                                                          
13 The change in interest payments sums up to zero, when taking into account the rest of the world.BOX on the monetary channel  in the Bundesbank model
In the Bundesbank model there is a separate monetary channel which transmits interest
rate impulses via the price gap to inflation. This channel, which is absent in other country
models, accounts for the empirical observation that inflation in the long run is a monetary
phenomenon. The price gap derives from the long run money demand equation,
(1) u i y ~ p m + γ − β + =
where m denotes the stock of money holdings, p is the price level,  y ~ is output (all in
logs), i is the interest rate and u is the deviation between money holdings and long run
money demand, i.e. the monetary overhang. Moreover, ß is the long run income elasticity
and  γ is the interest rate elasticity of money demand. Using (1), the equilibrium price level
(p*) is defined as the price level which is consistent with the actual stock of money holdings
if output, the interest rate and money demand are in equilibrium  (i.e.  * y ~ y ~ = , i = i*, u = 0):
(2) * i * y ~ m * p γ + β − =
Defining the output gap as  * y ~ y ~ y − = and the deviation of the interest rate from its
equilibrium as R = i – i* , the price gap is
(3) [] u R y u R y ) 1 ( y p * p + γ − β = + γ − − β + = −
The term in brackets is the liquidity gap (v* - v), i.e. the deviation between trend
velocity and actual velocity of money. Hence, the price gap can be viewed as a measure for
inflationary pressures which combines information from the aggregate goods market (the
output gap) as well as from the money market (the liquidity gap). There is a positive
liquidity gap, i.e. velocity is below its trend level, if the output gap is positive,
14 if the
interest rate is below its equilibrium level or if there is a positive monetary overhang.
Empirically, the P-Star model relies on two conditions: (1) There is a stable long run money
demand function and (2) Inflation is a function of the price gap. Both conditions have found
empirical support for Germany and may hold at the Euro area level as well.22
4. The monetary policy experiment
This section summarises the agreed design of the standard simulation experiment that
was followed for the WGEM Monetary Transmission Exercise. Before spelling out the
details of the simulation it is worthwhile discussing the possible approaches available for
conducting comparative simulation exercises. There is a large literature on undertaking
model comparisons and a number of different approaches can be seen. One approach is to
‘let models be models’
15 and – on the basis of a broad outline - give individual modellers
considerable freedom in the design of the simulation exercises that they are undertaking. For
example this approach was taken in the projects sponsored by the Brookings Institution
(Bryant et al (1988) and (1993)) and the European Commission (Barrell and Whitley (1992)).
The argument for doing this is that individual modellers are in the best position to know how
to use their models in such simulation exercises. Early attempts by ‘outsiders’ to undertake
identical simulations on different models were heavily criticised:
“Third-party scholars have frequently attempted to evaluate and compare large-scale
econometric models by trying to interpret the model builders’ data, work-sheets, and
procedures. In many cases the outsiders have failed to employ acceptable procedures, have
done violence to the models in respecification or reestimation and , in general, used data
inefficiently” (Fromm and Klein (1973), p. 385).
Nevertheless, there will always be the question of comparability of the results when
individual modellers are given considerable freedom in the design of simulations. As
Mitchell et al (1998) point out when discussing the comparability of global models:
“Thus, when important differences are observed in the model’s predictions of the
global economic response to policy interventions of various kinds, as they invariably are, it
may be that these are due at least in part to differences in side conditions or other
adjustments that individual model proprietors have made, but the extent to which this is true
remains unknown.” (Mitchell et al (1998), p.2)
                                                                                                                                                                                  
14 This is a spillover effect from the goods market which appears if the income elasticity of money demand
is larger than unity.
15 To use a phrase coined by Adams and Klein (1991).23
One approach to undertaking genuinely comparable exercises is for one body which
had a good understanding of the models to undertake the simulation exercise. This was the
approach taken by the Macro Modelling Bureau at the University of Warwick which – prior
to its closure in 1999 - undertook regular comparative exercises on models of both the UK
and the global economy that were deposited with it. Such an approach would not have been
viable with this exercise given the use of 13 separate models from the banks comprising the
Eurosystem. Rather it was decided to agree the details of a common simulation exercise to
be undertaken on all models. This way it was hoped that it might be possible to generate
genuinely comparable results without doing too much ‘violence to the models’.
These details were agreed at meetings of the WGEM in late 2000 and early 2001 and
relate to the treatment of monetary and fiscal policy, long rates, exchange rates, international
spillovers and wage policies. If given complete freedom it is fair to say that many of the
individual modellers would probably not have chosen to undertake exactly the agreed
experiment. In all likelihood they would have preferred to undertake the exercise in a
somewhat different way to best utilise the features of their models. Nevertheless, for an
exercise of this type it was particularly important that members of the working group agreed
all the details of the simulation design in order to ensure that the simulation results were
genuinely comparable. For example, it would not have been meaningful to compare results
across simulations that were based on different assumptions about fiscal policy or the
exchange rate following a monetary policy shock. The aim was to minimise differences due
to simulation design so that by comparing results it would be possible to gauge the effects of
differences in the models. The differences in the models would reflect in part, differences in
the underlying economies and also in part differences in the philosophy of the model
builders.
Nevertheless, in recognition of the fact that this exercise could have been performed in
a number of different ways some scope was allowed for individual members who wished to
undertake additional variant simulations to illustrate the importance of some assumptions or
features of their models. For example, the model of the Bundesbank has been used with and
without a P-star effect incorporated to offer an insight into the effect of such an approach.
More generally, the issues surrounding the design of monetary policy experiments are
explored in the paper by McAdam and Morgan (2001).24
The first detail to be agreed by the WGEM members related to the construction of a
baseline. This was necessary as there was the possibility that differences in the baseline may
have some impact on the simulation results.
16 Although it was not appropriate to fix an
identical baseline (e.g. the same GDP growth rates etc in each country) it did make sense to
ensure that they were based on the same external assumptions and that they related to the
same time period. It was agreed that the exercise would cover a 10-year horizon and from
2001Q1-2010Q4 and would therefore require a baseline extending at least to 2010Q4. This
was the minimum length of the baseline, however, since those models with many forward-
looking elements would benefit from having a significantly longer baseline than this. The
baseline short-term interest rate was projected at a constant value and the exchange rate was
projected at its last assumed value over the horizon. External assumptions were also made
common across the baselines.
The agreed details of the monetary policy experiment were as follows. Following BIS
(1995), the monetary policy shock was a two-year increase of the short-term policy interest
rates by 1 percentage point from 2001Q1-2002Q4. From and including 2003Q1 a return to
baseline values was assumed.
17 This meant that no monetary policy rules were implemented.
Whether this choice is appropriate or not is arguable. According to Taylor (1995), the links
of the monetary transmission form a circle, with the circle being closed by linking the
movements in real GDP and inflation back to the short-term interest rate through a policy
rule. A story of the monetary transmission mechanism which does not include a description
of the central bank’s reaction function is therefore incomplete. In addition, a policy rule may
be helpful for achieving model stability. Whilst recognising these objections, no simple
solution was available: if a common policy framework is to be imposed, the policy rule must
respond not to domestic but to area-wide variables, whose path represents the output of the
                                                          
16 The baseline is only an issue in the presence of non-linearities. For some models variant simulations were
undertaken with differing baselines and the effects were not found to be particularly large. Nevertheless, the
construction of a baseline using a common set of assumptions was thought to be a prudent starting point for the
exercise.
17 This meant that the experiment was a temporary one, as a permanent change in the nominal interest rate
would force most models onto an explosive path. An alternative approach would have been a permanent shock
such as a permanent shift in a policy rule. For example, Church et al (2000) examine monetary policy through a
permanent change in the inflation target. Unfortunately such an approach would not have been possible in this25
experiment and is therefore not known when the national models are simulated. It could be
possible to iterate so as to reach some kind of convergence, but the value of such an
approach is far from certain. Although not the most faithful representation of the working of
a central bank, it is likely that the experiment, so as it is designed, provides a reasonable
approximation to the response of the euro-area economy to a monetary policy tightening.
Under the assumption that the policy action was perfectly anticipated by financial
markets, asset prices were assumed to move according to arbitrage conditions. The term
structure was modelled using the expectations hypothesis, while exchange rates were
determined by an uncovered interest parity condition. In both cases, risk premia were held
constant at baseline values and there were no changes in inflation expectations.
18 The
bilateral exchange rate between third country currencies (e.g. USD versus JPY) was assumed
to remain unchanged. Clearly there was also no change in the bilateral exchange rates for the
residual currencies of the euro area. As a result, the nominal effective exchange rate of each
country changes as a function of the weight of the non-euro countries (Table 6.1).
Models were initially operated in ‘isolated’ mode without international spillovers (e.g.
changes in foreign demand). Therefore, at the outset no assumptions were made about any
change in foreign variables due to the simulation that might feed back into the domestic
results. However, such effects were taken into account in a second round through an
exchange of results between modellers whereby the results of the first run of all models in
isolated mode were incorporated in each model.
19
No fiscal policy rules (e.g. targeting a specific government budget or debt stock target)
were used in the simulations. Once again, it may have been useful in terms of stabilising
some of the models to ensure that such rules were in operation. Nevertheless, incorporating
                                                                                                                                                                                  
exercise as a common change in a policy rule would have induced differing interest rate reactions in each
country – which would not have been compatible with monetary union.
18 Whilst there are small differences in long-term interest rates in euro area countries it was not thought
appropriate to allow different long-rate reactions across countries. In other words, it was assumed that the
differential between long-term interest rates were unaffected by the monetary policy experiment.
19 This process could be repeated a number of times until the spillover effects appear to have settled down.
The results presented in this paper are those obtained after one round of iteration as after close inspection it was
concluded by the Working Group that more rounds of iteration were not required as no further meaningful
changes in the results were anticipated.26
differing fiscal reactions would have seriously undermined the comparability of the results.
However, in line with their usual practices, modellers were free to choose whether to keep
nominal or real government consumption constant. In some countries government
expenditure is typically fixed in nominal terms for a few years ahead so that a shock which
alters the deflator for government expenditure may affect real magnitudes. In other cases it
may be more realistic to envisage nominal government expenditure adjusting somewhat to
ensure that real magnitudes are unchanged.
Despite the need for a wide-ranging agreement on the details of these simulations,
many differences remained in model design. For example, some models incorporated – to a
greater or lesser extent - forward-looking behaviour in financial markets and the real
economy. As regards some financial variables, such as asset prices, it was also agreed to let
each team decide on whether to endogenise such factors and thus the way and extent to
which the shock would impact on such variables.
5. Method of identifying the channels
The channel decomposition has been implemented according to the so-called ‘flag
approach’, which is described in Altissimo et al. (2001). The method is designed to provide
a decomposition which minimises the unexplained residual and which does not alter the
relative magnitude of the various channels. In particular, Altissimo et al. claim that this
approach guarantees an exact decomposition when applied to linear models, without regard
to the expectations formation mechanism. The implementation of the method requires that a
number of simulations equal to the number of channels are run. It may be briefly described
as follows:
1.  identify all the J channels whose empirical relevance is to be quantified;
2.  for each channel, introduce a dummy variable taking the values 0 or 1 (''flag'' variable).
There will then be as many flag variables as the number of channels. The flag variable
associated with the j-th channel will be set equal to 1 only in the simulation aiming at
isolating the effects that transit through the j-th channel; it will be set equal to 0 in all
other simulations;27
3.  replace the policy variable, wherever it appears in the model, with an expression given
by the sum of two components: (i) the shocked policy variable times the flag variable
corresponding to that channel; (ii) the baseline policy variable times the difference
between 1 and the flag variable;
4.  run J simulations; in each of them, only one flag variable is set equal to 1, whereas all
others are set to zero. Hence, in each simulation, the endogenous variables are left free to
react (because simultaneity is fully taken into account), but can directly respond to the
policy shock only through the channel corresponding to the active flag variable.
A possible alternative decomposition suggested in Mauskopf (1990) takes a different
route. Mauskopf selected a set of sub-blocks of the Federal Reserve's MPS model, that were
then successively simulated in isolation. The sub-blocks were designed in such a way so that
each of them included just one direct transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and a
number of indirect mechanisms, chosen so as not to interfere with the mechanisms activated
by other channels. While allowing for possible within-block simultaneity, such an approach
clearly neglects, by design, any simultaneous interactions among sub-blocks. As a result of
not fully taking the simultaneous nature of the model into account, this approach generates
an unexplained residual, being the difference between the overall effect and the sum of the
effects associated with all individual transmission channels.
The fact that the sum of individual effects does not match the overall effect of a
monetary policy shock on the economy may not be such a serious drawback. If the approach
described above turned out not to bias the ranking of the various channels and the relative
size of the associated effects on output and prices, then that approach would still be largely
reliable for all practical purposes. However, the approach proposed in Mauskopf (1990) can
be shown to result, in general, in an incorrect ranking of the channels of transmission of
monetary policy. For this reason there was a preference to use the ‘flag’ method.28
6. The results
6.1  Introduction
This section presents the results of the simulation exercise. The outcomes relate to full
model simulations based on the common design of the experiment, and using the ‘flag’
method of channel decomposition discussed in the previous section.






























































































Short term interest rate Long term interest rate (10y)29
Figure 6.1 summarises the common assumptions underlying the response pattern of the
euro exchange rate vis-à-vis non-euro countries and the long-term interest rate (10 year
bond). These assumptions entail that the interest rate shock is accompanied by an
appreciation of the euro with respect to non-euro currencies of 1.6per cent on average in the
first year and 0.6per cent in the second. However, the size of this change in terms of the
national effective exchange rates depends on the weights of the non-euro countries in the
international trade of the respective economies. Table 6.1 reports on these weights.














The results across countries share some general features coming from the
characteristics of macro-econometric models. A widely shared property of these models is
that the effect of a change in prices, to the extent that it affects the system of relative prices,
has in general a more immediate effect on volumes (real activity) than the reverse. Aside
from the impact of the price of imported goods and services and competitors’ prices,
domestic prices are basically a function of unit labour costs. Due to the productivity cycle, a
change in activity is slow to fully materialise into a change in employment and therefore to
impact on wages through a change in the unemployment rate (Phillips effect). But different
treatments of expectations may alter this scheme. In the Italian case, for instance, the
expectation channel speeds up the working of the Phillips curve and contributes to shorten30
the average length of output fluctuations. In the Bundesbank model domestic prices are also
determined by a weighted average of forward-looking and backward-looking inflationary
expectations, and by changes in the euro area equilibrium price level P-Star as well as by
deviations of P-Star from the German price deflator of domestic demand. Nonetheless, on
the basis of this general property, a distinction can be made between the exchange rate
channel, that will have a direct impact on prices, and the other conventional channels that
will have a direct impact on components of domestic demand and hence indirectly on prices.
Section 6.2 gives a more detailed discussion of price effects, while section 6.3 focuses on
real activity. Various graphs illustrate the main trust of the results whilst more detailed
background tables are presented in the Annex.
6.2  Impact on prices
In macro-econometric models the wage-price system forms a highly interdependent
system of equations. In many models - but not all - the consumption and investment
deflators are modelled using quasi-definitional relationships, making them a weighted
average of the output price and the import price, the weights being respectively the shares of
domestically produced and imported goods and services. The import price is basically a
weighted average of a competitors’ price index and the domestic output deflator. The former
gives the average price at which the foreign suppliers sell their goods and services. The latter
reflects the domestic market conditions. This set-up gives a key role to the output deflator,
since it impacts both on the other domestic deflators and to some extent on the import
deflator. This output deflator is usually modelled as a mark-up over unit labour costs.
Finally, to close the system, the nominal wage is itself a function of a price variable – either
the output price itself or the consumption price or a combination of the two – labour
productivity, and the unemployment rate.
Figure 6.2 provides an overview of the aggregate effects for the euro area on four price
variables: the deflators of private consumption, real GDP, exports and imports. Figures 6.3
and 6.4 show the effects of the monetary policy shock on the private consumption deflator
according to the national models, the aggregate euro area response (see line “aggregate”), as
well as the response according to the AWM.31
In the first year the impact of the shock is smaller on the GDP deflator than on the
trade deflators. The internal developments driving the response of the GDP deflator have not
yet had a noticeable effect, whereas the exchange rate shock has a direct and immediate
impact on the trade deflators. Everything being equal, the higher the degree of openness, the
bigger the impact on import prices. The difference in the magnitude of the change in
domestic prices compared to trade prices leads to a loss of competitiveness. 
20 The biggest
impact on the GDP deflator (see Table A.1 in the Annex) appears in Finland (-0.44%). This
is actually the country in which the labour market reacts most rapidly to the exchange rate.
To some extent, a similar pattern can also be seen in Greece (-0.15%). In Italy, there is also a
reduction in the GDP deflator (-0.16%), but in this case it is linked to a fall in the mark-up in
order to reduce the losses in competitiveness created by the exchange rate response. As
expected, the trade deflators are modified more markedly in the countries that are more open
to trade with non-euro area countries (Ireland and Finland).
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20 Because of the delayed response of employment to the change in activity, the reduction in activity can
lead to a temporary fall in productivity compared to baseline, leading to a rise in unit labour costs and hence, in
some cases, in the output price.Figure 6.3  Effects on consumption deflator in various countries: moderate effects




















Belgium France Ireland Luxemburg Austria Aggregate





















Germany Greece Spain Italy Netherlands Aggregate Portugal Finland AWM
                                                                                                                                                                                  
21  Aggregate effects for the euro area are GDP-weighted averages of national effects.33
The change in the consumption deflator in the first year is almost exclusively due to
the exchange rate response and its impact on the import deflator. This is confirmed by the
decomposition which shows that other channels of transmission make at most a negligible
contribution to the change in the consumption deflator. Figure 6.5 reports on the
decomposition of the aggregate effects on the private consumption deflator according to the
NCB models. TOT is the total effect, EXR the contribution of the exchange rate channel,
SUB the substitution channel, UCC the user cost of capital channel, INC the combined
income and cash-flow channel, WEA the wealth channel, OTHER the combined
contribution of the monetary channel (Germany) and the expectations channel (Italy), and
SPILL the contribution of the international spilllovers. In Finland, Greece and Italy, where
there is a more substantial impact on the GDP deflator in the first year, the response of the
consumption deflator is also bigger than in the other countries (Table A.1).
As of the second year, the GDP deflator deviates more markedly from baseline in all
countries except Finland (Table A.1). These changes in turn influence both the trade
deflators and the domestic deflators. Nevertheless the channel decomposition still shows
that, for the most part, the exchange rate channel remains the main driving force of the
consumption deflator in the second year. In Germany and Italy where country-specific
channels have been taken into account, these channels actually start to a play a role in the
second year. Most notably, in Germany the monetary channel accounts for one third of the
fall in consumer prices (Table A.3 in the Annex). International spillover effects, although
slowly gaining weight, are not very important at this stage.
The interest rates and the exchange rate are back to baseline at the beginning of the
third year. This represents a “counter shock” but, strictly speaking, only for the short term
rate since, both the long term rates and the exchange rate already moved gradually back to
baseline over the first two years (Figure 6.1). The dynamics are then influenced by the
evolution of these variables and the lagged effects triggered in the preceding years. The GDP
deflator and the import deflator exhibit different behaviour (Figure 6.2). In most countries,
the GDP deflator continues to fall below baseline whereas the import deflator tends to move
back towards the baseline. In around half of the countries, the consumption deflator
continues to decline relative to the baseline as in these cases it is mainly driven by the GDP
deflator at this stage of the propagation mechanism. However, in some other countries, the34
influence of the import deflator allows a stabilisation of the consumption deflator (most
notably Austria, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, the Netherlands). In Finland, the rapid
dynamics at work when the shock occurred in the first year are also at work when the
exogenous variables are back at baseline: the GDP deflator rapidly returns to the baseline as
from the third year and also drives the consumption deflator in this direction.
In addition, the channel decomposition shows that in some countries, even if the
exchange rate channel is still important, the other channels have started to take over (Figure
6.5 and Table A.3). As already indicated, this is clearly evident in Germany, where the
monetary channel accounts for the main part of the price effects, and in Italy, where the
expectations channel is an important transmission mechanism for prices. But it is also true
for Spain (cost of capital channel), France and Portugal (substitution channel). In Finland,
the contribution of the exchange rate channel is partly offset by the contributions of other
channels that exert inflationary pressures, essentially the cost-of-capital and substitution
channels. International spillovers are becoming more and more important with an aggregate
contribution similar in size to that of the combined substitution and cost-of-capital channel.
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There is no general consensus about what drives prices from the fourth year onwards.
In most countries, the exchange rate channel still plays an important role. In fact on average
it remains the largest single contributor over the simulation horizon (Figure 6.5).
International spillovers are gaining further weight, as is the monetary channel in the German
case. The substitution channel makes a significant contribution, notably in Greece, Ireland,
France and Portugal, and the cost-of-capital channel in Spain and Italy. In general, the
income/cash flow and the wealth effects do not play any significant role in the determination
of prices, except in the case of Italy where the former explains part of the drift in the price
level. To some extent this will be due to the offsetting effects of changes in interest rates on
the income of lenders and the cash flow of borrowers as discussed in section 2.
To sum up:
•  There are a number of countries for which price effects are relatively moderate (Figure
6.3), with consumer prices falling 0.25per cent below base at the maximum. This group
includes Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria. There is another group
showing price effects close to or exceeding the aggregate response (Figure 6.4). This
group includes the other countries and the AWM also belongs to this category.
•  The impact on the consumption deflator is on average around -0.1per cent in the first
year. Finland is the only country where a particularly marked short term impact arises (-
0.5%). The aggregate maximum response of consumer prices is 0.4per cent below base,
an effect that is reached in the fourth year. Note that this aggregate timing profile masks
differences between countries. In the models for Greece, Spain, France, Ireland,
Netherlands, Portugal and the AWM prices still seem to be decreasing in the fifth year,
although in many cases the price falls are becoming less marked. In Belgium price levels
reach their maximum reduction in year 3, in Luxembourg in year 2, and in Finland in
year 1. In the long run price responses are relatively large for AWM (-0.7%) and Spain (-
0.9%).
•  Overall the exchange rate channel is the most important channel throughout the
simulation period, very much so in the short run. In the medium term other channels
become marked as well: the monetary channel in the German case; the expectations36
channel in the Italian case; the cost of capital channel in Spain and Italy; and the
substitution channel in Greece, Ireland, France and Portugal. Moreover, international
spillovers provide a significant propagation mechanism in all countries.
6.3  Impact on real activity
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 summarise the main findings in terms of real GDP. In the first year
real GDP falls on average by 0.2 per cent relative to baseline (see line “aggregate”). The
maximum average reduction in real GDP of 0.4per cent is obtained in year 2 of the
simulation. Thereafter, with nominal short-term interest rates returning immediately to base,
real GDP also starts its return to baseline, which is reached by year 5 (2005). These
“aggregate” results contrast with those obtained by the AWM. The latter show a stronger
impact of the monetary policy action, both in the short and in the medium term. The AWM
requires a monetary policy rule to be in place in order to speed the adjustment towards a
stable equilibrium. Without such a rule kicked in after year 2, the experiment initiates a quite
persistent deflationary spiral in the AWM. In this respect, the AWM differs from most of the
national models.
Figure 6.6   Effects on real GDP in various countries: moderate effects
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Across countries differences may be noted. Effects on real GDP are modest for
Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland, with maximum effects
in absolute terms under 0.35per cent (see Figure 6.6 and Table A.2). A second group of
countries with maximum effects on real GDP in the range between -0.35 per cent and -0.6
per cent consists of Spain, Ireland, Italy and Austria. Finally, in Greece and Portugal the fall
in real GDP is largest: close to 0.8 per cent below base (Figure 6.7). Differences also occur
in terms of timing and cycling. In 7 out of 12 euro-countries the negative impact on real
GDP is strongest in year 2. In Finland the impact on output is faster, whereas in Portugal,
Austria, Luxembourg and Spain it takes about three years to reach the maximum response.
Cycles, in the sense that the initial reduction in real GDP bottoms out and output starts
moving to above baseline levels within five years, occur in Germany and Italy.
Further insights into the underlying similarities and differences across countries may
be obtained by looking more closely at the importance of the various transmission channels.
Figure 6.8 does so for the aggregate GDP effects, whereas Table A.4 in the Annex presents38
the results for individual country models and the AWM.
22 This gives rise to the following
observations:
•  The exchange rate channel plays its main role in the short run. In the first year it is the
main contributor to the fall in real GDP in Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria,
Finland, and Belgium. It is second important and still quite substantial in Greece, Spain
and Italy. In Ireland the exchange rate channel, while not very prominent in the first year,
gains strength in the medium term.
•  The direct substitution channel is particularly strong in Greece, France, Ireland and
Portugal, dominating the results in the short and medium term. As of year 2002 it is also
very substantial in Austria, surpassing in size the other channels from 2003 onwards.
•  In the short run, the cost-of-capital channel is the most important channel in Italy, Spain
(together with the exchange rate channel) and the AWM. In the longer term it is the main
factor driving the results in Italy, Netherlands, Ireland, and Finland. In the AWM it
dwarfs the other channels in the medium and long run.
•  The income/cash flow channel tends to be rather weak in the short run and mitigates the
reduction in real GDP in most countries up to and including year 3. In comparison with
other countries it is fairly strong in Italy.
•  The wealth channel is also rather weak, with the exception of Austria (and to some extent
also Italy) where it contributes substantially to the fall in GDP. In Germany, Greece,
Spain, France and Portugal the wealth channel is absent.
•  The monetary channel in the German model triggers a relatively fast return of real GDP
to baseline due to a fall in prices in connection with lower holdings of M3.  In the Italian
model, the expectations channel, implying that monetary policy actions directly affect
inflation expectations, plays a modest role but nonetheless helps to bring real activity
levels back to base fairly quickly.
                                                          
22 The residual channel is relatively large in the AWM as it includes interest rate effects on inventories.39
•  International spillovers enhance the size of the output effects significantly as from 2002.
In 2003 they account for one third of the total aggregate effect on real GDP in the euro
area.
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The aggregate effect on euro-area output (and prices) suggests that on average the
exchange rate channel is crucial in the process of monetary policy transmission in the short-
run. This is confirmed by the AWM simulations (Table A.4 in the Annex). In the medium
and long term, the cost-of-capital channel and the direct substitution channel account for
most of the downward pressure on real GDP. Another perhaps remarkable result, given the
increased importance of stocks and bonds in portfolios of households and firms, is the fairly
modest role of the wealth channel. In the case of France, the issue is controversial and the
evidence supporting the existence of a wealth channel is not very robust (see Artus et. al.
(1989) and Bonnet and Dubois (1995)). The absence of wealth as a separate transmission
channel in Germany and the fact that in France wealth does not seem to be very important at
least in the short run finds support in a recent IMF-study by Edison and Sloek (2001).
Another reason why wealth and valuation effects would be moderate anyway, even if40
accounted for in the models, relates to the fact that, by assumption, the interest rate shock is
a temporary one so that forward looking long-term interest rates respond only partially,
mitigating the impact on asset prices.
The same mechanism weakens the strength of the substitution and cost-of-capital
channels in Germany and Netherlands, where long rates rather than short rates affect
investment and private consumption. This is in line with the fact that firms and households
in these countries prefer long-term over short-term debt as a means of financing spending
(see Table 6.2). A further argument for Germany is the existence of  ‘relationship banking’
entailing close ties between corporations and banks, such that changes in the cost of capital
have a relatively small impact. Further evidence on this is documented in Ehrmann and
Worms (2001).
Table 6.2    Fraction of short-term financing 1999/2000
BE DE GR ES FR IR IT LX NE AT PT FI
Households 7 8 29 35 7 n.a. 20 n.a. 6 n.a. 9
(*) n.a.
Fims 30 22 70 7 28 n.a. 57 n.a. 34 n.a. 20
(*) 73
(*)< 1 year.
Table 6.3    Net interest received 1999/2000 (% of disposable income)
BE DE GR ES FR IR IT LX NE AT PT FI
Households 8- 3 4
(*) 1 1 n.a. 5 n.a. -7 n.a. 0 -3
Fims -131 n.a. -28 -42 n.a. -30 n.a. -27 n.a. -4
(#) -26
(*) households plus firms;  
(#) % of GDP.
Qualitatively, the contribution of the income/cash flow channel of transmission
depends on the financial position of households and firms (Table 6.3). In Italy, the positive
contribution of the income channel reflects the fact that households are net creditors, and
raise consumption in response to the increase in interest payments received on holdings of
government debt. In Finland and Netherlands, households are net debtors. Hence, the income
channel tends to reinforce the drop in output in these countries.
Effects on private consumption are notably strong in countries where the substitution
channel plays an important role (Table A.2 in the Annex). This holds for Greece and41
Portugal, but also for Austria and Ireland and to some extent France. In Belgium
consumption is slightly but persistently above base, which is due to the net creditorship of
households feeding into the substitution channel (note that the income and substitution
channels are difficult to disentangle in the case of Belgium).
23 In Finland the exchange rate
and substitution channels push private consumption above base in year 2 and 3, respectively.
In Italy higher net interest payments to households are the main factor driving  private
consumption above base as of 2004. In Germany the monetary channel makes prices fall
faster than wages in the medium term, thereby fostering consumer spending. All in all,
effects on private consumption tend to be relatively weak in Belgium, Netherlands, Germany
and Finland. This is due in part to the moderate change in long-term interest rates.
Capital formation (including inventories) falls in the short run relative to the baseline,
as a result of both higher cost-of-capital and lower economic activity, the latter initiated by
the reduction in exports and private consumption. In nearly all cases, the cash-flow channel
appears negligible. Exceptions are Belgium where the cash flow effect on investment is quite
important (Table A.4). This is in line with the net debtorship of Belgian firms (see Table
6.3). In the longer term lower cash flows also explain a substantial part of the negative
investment response in the Netherlands (2005), where firms too are net debtors. The
distribution of the national responses of investment is very wide, with maxima ranging
between -0.3 per cent for Germany and France and -3.6 per cent for Italy and Ireland. In
between, there is a group of countries for which the impact is moderate (Belgium,
Netherlands and Finland) and another group with maxima close to -2 per cent (Greece,
Spain, Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal). Negative responses of investment are very
persistent in the AWM and the models for Greece and Ireland.
The impact of the monetary policy shock on unemployment is a crucial element in the
process of monetary policy transmission on prices in the medium and long term.
Unemployment acts on prices via the wage formation process (see Section 6.2). In most
countries the supply of labour is largely determined by demographics and thus the
                                                          
23In the Belgian model, the consumption is derived from the Blanchard-Buiter type of model, in which the
Ricardian equivalence does not hold.42
development of unemployment closely reflects movements in labour demand. The latter
responds with some lag to changes in output and real product wages. Hence, countries with
moderate GDP effects such as Germany, France, and Belgium also show relatively small
changes of  unemployment. In the case of the Netherlands discouraged worker effects on
labour supply help to mitigate the impact on unemployment. Similar mechanisms are at
work in Italy, Portugal and Spain. The overall impact on unemployment is relatively large in
Spain, followed by Greece, Austria and Finland. In the latter country employment seems to
react much less sluggishly to output.
6.4  Comparison with BIS (1995)
As in the present study, the channels of monetary transmission and their similarities
and differences across countries were the main focus of attention in the central bank model
comparison project carried out under the auspices of the BIS in 1994. As touched upon in the
Introduction, the design of the current exercise and that of the BIS comparison project have
one important point in common, namely the type of shock under investigation: a two-year
100 basis points increase in the policy controlled interest rate, after which the policy rate
immediately returns to baseline. Another common element should be mentioned too: a full-
model decomposition method was used to identify each single transmission channel.
However, there are also many important differences in the two exercises. In the BIS
project, the response pattern of long-term interest rates reflected the NCB’s model equation
explaining the representative long-term rate; now, the expectations theory of the term
structure, with no change in risk premia, is taken as a common workhorse to pin down the
response of the long rates. In the BIS project, it was assumed that the nominal exchange rates
between the ERM countries Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg
remain fixed.
24 Moreover, with the exception of Italy the response pattern of the effective
exchange rate is much more backward looking than it is now.  Furthermore, the individual
country results in the BIS project did not include international spillover effects.
                                                          
24 The exchange rate of the Austrian shilling, which at the time did not yet participate in the ERM, also
remained fixed vis-á-vis these countries. The Italian lira was floating freely.43
There are also differences in coverage of the results as this study presents results for all
individual euro-countries (and for the euro-area as a whole), while of this group the BIS
project included only Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria
(in addition to several non euro area countries). Furthermore, BIS (1995) only presents a
channel decomposition for the effects on real GDP, not for prices or other variables.
Because of the differences in the design of the exercise, and because the NCB models
have undergone changes in the course of time which may partly reflect changes in economic
and financial structures but also revisions of old data (ESA95), the comparison with the BIS
project has to be mainly qualitative in nature. In order not to complicate the analysis any
further the comparison will be based on the results excluding the international spillover
effects.
Table 6.4   Total effect on real GDP: BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) -0.15 -0.37 -0.30 -0.07 0.09
- WGEM (2001) -0.26 -0.26 0.00 0.20 0.26
France
- BIS (1995) -0.18 -0.36 -0.20 0.01 0.07
- WGEM (2001) -0.13 -0.22 -0.15 -0.07 -0.02
Italy
- BIS (1995) -0.32 -0.53 -0.22 -0.08 -0.13
- WGEM (2001) -0.24 -0.55 -0.50 -0.16 0.10
Spain
- BIS (1995) -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.17 -0.17
- WGEM (2001) -0.10 -0.37 -0.51 -0.44 -0.28
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) -0.10 -0.18 -0.15 -0.09 -0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08
Belgium
- BIS (1995) -0.03 -0.12 -0.23 -0.15 0.02
- WGEM (2001) -0.10 -0.21 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08
Austria
- BIS (1995) -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 0.04 0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.21 -0.38 -0.37 -0.26 -0.2544
Table 6.4 summarises the effects of a monetary policy shock on real GDP for BIS
(1995) and the current exercise (WGEM (2001)).
With the exception of Germany and Italy, the negative output effects tend to be more
persistent now compared to BIS (1995). As to the magnitude of the negative output effects,
these are substantially larger now for Austria and Spain than in 1994/1995. In the case of
Spain and Austria, new models have replaced old ones which hampers the assessment of the
underlying causes. The German results now show a much faster recovery effect than in BIS
(1995), which is due to a significantly stronger impact of the monetary channel in the latest
model version (Bundesbank, 2000).
Table 6.5   Effect on consumption deflator: BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) -0.03 -0.14 -0.31 -0.45 -0.55
- WGEM (2001) -0.05 -0.17 -0.34 -0.50 -0.47
France
- BIS (1995) -0.05 -0.15 -0.25 -0.32 -0.32
- WGEM (2001) -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10
Italy
- BIS (1995) -0.48 -0.64 -0.53 -0.17 0.10
- WGEM (2001) -0.14 -0.29 -0.43 -0.44 -0.29
Spain
- BIS (1995) -0.26 -0.54 -0.66 -0.95 -1.28
- WGEM (2001) -0.03 -0.22 -0.39 -0.55 -0.67
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) -0.13 -0.35 -0.35 -0.23 -0.27
- WGEM (2001) -0.10 -0.17 -0.16 -0.19 -0.21
Belgium
- BIS (1995) -0.14 -0.48 -0.79 -0.81 -0.55
- WGEM (2001) -0.02 -0.07 -0.15 -0.29 -0.44
Austria
- BIS (1995) -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02
- WGEM (2001) -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.0645
The response of the effective exchange rate plays a crucial role in understanding the
effects on consumer prices and the differences in this respect between WGEM (2001) and
BIS (1995), in particular in year 1 and 2 (Table 6.5). For countries such as Germany and
Austria, the initial reaction of the exchange rate is more marked than in BIS (1995). As a
result, consumer prices in these countries initially move more, despite the fact that in Austria
the pass-through of exchange rate changes to consumer prices is somewhat smaller now. In
the Netherlands, the initial price effects are smaller now because of a more sluggish pass-
through of import prices in consumer prices. Another important factor driving the results
relates to the fact that the euro-area is larger than the ERM-area was in 1994, so that
effective exchange rates, and therefore import prices, exhibited a larger response in the BIS
exercise than they do in the present setting. This explains the differences for Italy and also
for Spain. In the case of Germany, the increased importance of the monetary channel in the
new model version explains why prices stay down as much as in BIS (1995) despite the fact
that the effective exchange rate moves less as of year 2.
6.5  A closer look at the individual channels
Due to the extension of ERM and its development into EMU, one would expect the
overall response of the effective exchange rate of each of the individual countries to be less
marked than it was in BIS (1995). For Italy, France and Belgium, this indeed seems to be the
case as can be inferred from Table A.5.1 in the Annex. However, for several reasons this
result does not hold for all countries. First, in the BIS exercise the exchange rates responded
according to the respective model equations; now, the response is an agreed upon common
element in the design of the exercise. This difference in approach seems to be important for
understanding the Austrian results, which are now somewhat more marked. Second, in the
BIS exercise the nature of the exchange rate response was backward looking, reaching its
largest deviation from base after eight quarters; now, the exchange rate immediately jumps
to its largest deviation from base in the first quarter. Therefore, the response of the effective
exchange rate may be even larger in the first year, despite the larger currency union. This
holds for Germany and the Netherlands. In addition to this, the first year differences in the
German outcomes reflect changes to the modelling of export volumes and import prices.46
In Austria and France, the direct substitution channel on consumption (Table A.5.2) is
now a stronger contributor to the reduction in real GDP than it was in BIS (1995). For
France, this may be explained by the fact that the substitution effect only became significant
after the financial liberalisation of the late eighties. In the model of Austria, the interest rate
elasticity of private consumption in higher in the new model, which is in line with the
increased interest-rate consciousness observed in Austria over the last decade. In Belgium
and Germany, the substitution channel has become less important compared to BIS (1995).
Again, this will be partly due to the smaller response of the long-term interest rate in the
current exercise. More importantly, in the German model, the long rate has replaced the
short rate in the equation for private consumption since BIS (1995).
For the cost-of-capital channel a very diverse picture emerges (Table A.5.3). For three
euro-countries, the importance of the cost-of-capital channel has become stronger since BIS
(1995): Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. In the new model for Spain, investment is much
more sensitive to changes in interest rates. In the Netherlands the same is true for non-
residential investment. In the case of France, the cost-of-capital channel is now only
operating on inventory formation, which may explain why, overall, it has become weaker.
For Germany, the differences are not very marked: the scope for monetary transmission via
the cost-of-capital channel still is virtually absent. One aspect which may underpin the
likeliness of the reduced importance of the cost-of-capital for Belgium, France and Austria
vis-à-vis BIS (1995) is that, in the design of the current exercise, long-term interest rates
generally move less than they did in BIS (1995).
The income and cash flow channels now play a quantitatively very limited role in the
monetary policy transmission process (Table A.5.4). For Belgium, Germany, and France this
channel has become less important compared to BIS (1995). For Belgium and Germany, the
positive income effects reported in BIS (1995) no longer exist. The disappearance of the
income channel in Germany  reflects the fact that household debt has increased considerably
since the BIS exercise. For Belgium, this development is in line with the fact that firms have
been cumulating more net debt over the last decade. In the case of France, one could point to
increased household indebtedness. For Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Austria no
significant changes in the strength of the income/cash channel have occurred since BIS
(1995).47
Wealth channels are lacking in the current NCB models for Spain, Germany and
France (Table A.5.5). For the latter two, this was also the case in BIS (1995). In the case of
Italy, a wealth channel has now been included in the BIQM model, while it was absent in
1994/1995. In the case of Austria, the wealth channel has become more important and now
explains about one third of the fall in real GDP. The more prominent role of wealth in
Austria is related to the broadening of the wealth concept compared to BIS (1995), now
comprising money holdings, bonds and shares rather than money holdings only. Moreover,
interest rate changes affect the valuation of shares. In the Netherlands, the wealth channel
lost some of its force compared to BIS (1995). This is due to the fact that asset prices mainly
react to changes in  long-term interest rates, which now respond less. For the case of
Germany, one may add that only in the second half of the 1990s shareholding became more
important and wide-spread among the larger public. In the process of the reform of the
pension system, which will imply tax benefits for investment into private funds, this
development is expected to progress further. All in all, an increase in the importance of
wealth as a channel of monetary policy transmission is a possibility to consider for the near
future. This holds not only for Germany but also for other euro-countries.
All in all, for reasons mentioned before it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from
the comparison with BIS (1995). Despite the difficulties, some tentative statements could be
made, however. First, in a number of countries the positive output effect of the income
channel has reduced or disappeared altogether. Quite generally, the reason for this is a
weakening of the financial position of households and firms. Second, one conclusion one
perhaps would have expected beforehand to come out of this comparison exercise would be
an increased importance of the wealth channel. However, this conclusion can only be drawn
for Austria. For Germany and France the empirical evidence in support of (increased) wealth
effects is weak or not very robust yet. This may be due to the fact that the holdership and
valuation of wealth components have been changing rapidly only since the mid 1990s.
7. Validation of the results
To assess the validity of the results presented in the previous sections, it is worth
considering whether they are consistent with the stylised facts reported in the literature, how48
they compare with other studies and also whether or not cross-country differences in the
channel decomposition correspond to differences in the economic structures.
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), who mainly rely on VAR evidence, the
following four stylised facts characterise the response of the economy to monetary policy
shocks: (i) a monetary tightening induces, in the short run, a sustained decline in both output
and the price level; (ii) the fall in aggregate demand leads the contraction in production, with
inventories acting as a buffer; (iii) the component of aggregate demand which responds more
promptly to the deterioration in financing conditions is residential investment, with spending
on consumer goods (including both durables and non-durables) close behind; (iv) fixed
business investment eventually declines, but its fall lags behind the contraction in both
aggregate demand and supply.
25
Most of these features are to be found in the WGEM results. In all countries output and
prices decline after the rise in interest rate: the contraction persists for a few years, despite
the fact that the policy action is by assumption a temporary one. With regard to the
consumption deflator, in no case there is any evidence of a “price puzzle” although a cost-
push effect is apparent in Germany, where the increase in production costs pushes the GDP
deflator temporarily above the baseline. The lead-lag relationship between demand and
supply is implicit in the theoretical underpinnings of all models, which are demand-driven in
the short run. However, the response of production to the policy impulse is prompt and non-
negligible, so that inventories fall as well. So does consumer spending, which is, in a few
countries (Greece, France Austria and Portugal), the component of aggregate demand which
drives the slowdown in economic activity. The only significant difference with the picture
described by Bernanke-Gertler involves capital accumulation: business investment rather
than residential investment is most immediately and to the greatest extent affected by the rise
in interest rates. Whether this is a shortcoming is open to question. It may well reflect the
fact that within the euro area the elasticity of investment to the cost of capital is quite high,
                                                          
25 Such a response of fixed business investment – in terms both of timing and size - is possible if capital
accumulation has a zero (or very low) elasticity to the cost of capital  or, alternatively, if the cost of capital is
not affected, even in the short-run, by changes in the monetary policy stance: investment would then move only
because of the accelerator effect and because there exists a credit channel. This is by no means a piece of
undisputed empirical evidence. Taylor (1995), for instance, forcefully rejects this claim.49
which is witnessed by other empirical studies as well, for instance BIS (1995) and Taylor
(1993).
The WGEM results also square satisfactorily with the evidence presented in Peersman
and Smets (2001). A direct comparison is difficult because the size of  the shock and the
implied profile of the interest rate
26 are different. However a number of similarities are worth
mentioning. Output starts declining well in advance of prices and reaches its low by the end
of the first year; by allowing for a more sustained monetary shock, the trough would be
reached between the second and third year. Prices respond more sluggishly and continue to
fall until the fourth or fifth year (depending on the model considered). Both features
replicates quite closely the pattern outlined in the WGEM experiment. Back of the envelope
calculations suggest that the size of the output contraction (and possibly the fall in the price
level) is quite comparable as well.
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Concerning channel decomposition, Table 7.1 reports the ranking for each country and
lists a few variables which may be used to cross-check the WGEM results. The ranking is
computed in terms of the (cumulated) output losses caused by each channel in the first five
years of the simulation.
The variables included in the table are: (1) intra EU-15 exports as a share of GDP; (2)
the labour share of employees in employment; (3) short-term firm liabilities; (4) the import
share; (5) net interest received/paid by households as a share of disposable income. The first
indicator is related to the intra-area trade and should therefore be high for countries where
the spillover effect is large. The (complement to the) labour share proxies for the size of the
self-employed sector, which is likely to be less regulated and more affected by cyclical
conditions. The larger the share of self-employment, the larger labour income uncertainty
                                                          
26 The monetary policy shock, corresponding to one standard deviation, lasts one period and amounts to
roughly 30 basis points. The working of the policy rules induces some persistence in the response of the
interest rate, which returns to the baseline only in the third period.
27 The “proof” goes as follows. Consider model 1 and graph 1 at page 6 and focus on the first year, that is
the time interval in which output reaches a trough. In the first year, output is on average 0.07-0.08 p.p below
the baseline, while the rate of interest is 20 basis points above. Exploiting the linearity of the VAR model, a
shock of 100 basis points should yield a decline in output of around 0.4 p.p., which is more or less the size of
the trough in real GDP which is obtained in the average of the euro area, as shown in table A.2. The same
thought-experiment replicated for the price level confirms the similarity of the results derived with two very
different methodologies.50
and the more important the consumption channel.
28 The proportion of firm liabilities which
are short-term helps to quantify the extent of firms’ exposure to a tightening of financing
conditions. The import share measures the direct effect of the exchange rate on prices (and
hence competitiveness, net trade and output). The last indicator, net interest payments
received by households (as a share of disposable income), measures how important is the
income effect of a change in interest rates.
TABLE 7.1 - OUTPUT RESPONSE: CHANNEL DECOMPOSITION
E C S W I SP Intra EU-15 export
share
Labour share







1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Belgium 2 3 5 6 4 1 44.6 52.4 0.52 0.51 33.2 29.8 59.2 76.1  9.8  7.7
Germany 1 4 3 5 2 16.9 15.5 0.56 0.54 26.6 22.1 23.2 31.7 -1.2 -2.5
Greece 3 4 1 2  6.5  4.7 0.32 0.33 70.3 22.3 32.1
Spain 3 1 4 5 2  7.7 14.2 0.50 0.50 50.0 17.8 32.5  3.1  0.5
France 4 3 1 5 2 11.3 14.4 0.52 0.52 21.4 27.8 18.9 27.2  0.7  1.3
Ireland 2 1 3 5 4 39.1 47.2 0.46 0.40 19.3 20.8 51.0 87.3
Italy 4 1 2 6 5 3  9.6 11.4 0.46 0.41 65.7 57.2 21.1 28.5 10.4  5.4
Netherlands 3 2 5 4 6 1 33.4 31.4 0.51 0.51 23.8 34.0 47.8 61.4 -3.9 -7.1
Austria 2 5 1 4 6 3 17.5 20.8 0.53 0.52 28.7 35.4 47.6
Portugal 4 2 1 5 3 18.6 17.5 0.44 0.42 19.8 36.4 45.9  0.4
Finland 2 1 5 6 4 3 11.7 20.0 0.56 0.47 73.0 26.3 35.1 -2.6
The channels have been coded as follows: E stands for exchange-rate, C for the cost-of-capital, S means substitution-in-consumption, W is wealth, I is income and SP stands for
spillover. In a few cases, figures for Belgium aggregates data for Luxembourg as well.
‡ The starting value for DE is 1991, for LUX, the NL, PT and GR is 1995; the ending figure for PT is 1999.
¥ The starting value is 1991 for DE, 1995 for FR and 1994 for NL; the ending date for AT is 1999; for ES the figure refers to credit which is at variable rates and for PT debt are
considered short-term if they come due within a year.
¤ The starting for PT is 1995.
¢ Net interest payments as a share of GDP, households. The starting value for DE is 1993 and for NL is 1995; the ending figure for DE, BE and IT is 1999.
A few results are worth some comments. As expected the spillover channel is relevant
for Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, where intra area trade is a large share of
GDP; despite its openness to trade, this is not true for Ireland, presumably reflecting the high
trade with the United Kingdom for which no spillover effects are included. Self-employment
is large in Greece and Portugal, where the consumption channel is the most important, and is
sizeable also in Italy and Ireland, where it ranks second and third respectively. The share of
short-term liabilities in firms’ balance sheet helps explaining the magnitude of the cost-of-
capital channel in Finland, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, but does not help to explain the
results for Greece. The import share supports the influence of the exchange rate in Belgium
                                                          
28 For the share of self-employment to affect the size of the substitution-in-consumption channel rather than
being just an amplification mechanism which does not influence the ranking of the channels, it is necessary that
self-employed are more sensitive to interest rates changes, possibly through the interaction of liquidity
constraints and precautionary saving (see next paragraph).51
and Ireland, but is not helpful in understanding why this channel is so important in Germany.
Finally, the amount of interest payments to households is consistent with the relatively larger
role played by the income channel in Belgium.
The comparisons and assessments made in this section seek to determine whether the
WGEM results, which are driven by the specification choices made by model builders, are
also in line with the economic structures of the EMU countries. The evidence, whilst
admittedly noisy and far from conclusive, appears to be quite supportive.
8. Policy issues
As discussed in the Introduction, the move to a single currency and the centralisation
of the responsibility of policy decisions has made the understanding of the transmission
mechanism a key issue. As shown clearly in Tables A.1 and A.2, the responsiveness of
output and prices to a standardised increase in the monetary policy instrument is not uniform
across the euro area; on the contrary, there appear to be clusters of countries which are quite
homogeneous internally but different from each other. The same evidence is presented in
Figure 8.1, where a scatter plot of the maximum deviation from baseline of real GDP and the
consumption deflator is reported. The location of Greece and Portugal in the right-lower
bottom of the graph contrasts sharply with the position of Germany, Finland and the
Netherlands in the left-upper top.
The distinction, made in a number of previous studies, between a “core” region and a
“periphery”, is partially consistent with the WGEM evidence, though in fact more than two
clusters are present. At one extreme there are countries, like Germany, Benelux and Finland,
where a policy tightening is effective in curbing inflationary pressures at mild costs in terms
of output losses, while there are other EMU members, in particular Greece and Portugal,
where the increase in interest rates engenders a marked contraction in economic activity and
only a modest restraint on price developments. The remaining countries are located in-
between, though somewhat closer to the core region.
29
                                                          
29 The results for Austria and Spain do not fit convincingly the core-periphery story. Austria seems to share
the same features as Greece and Portugal, namely low responsiveness of prices coupled with large fluctuations52
The literature on European integration has tended to explain this dichotomy between
core and periphery by relying on supply side factors. Bean (1992), for instance, stresses the
relevance of intra-industry trade, which is especially prevalent within the core, while there is
more inter-industry trade between the core and the periphery. The WGEM results provide a
somewhat different picture, with both demand and supply factors playing a prominent role,
as one can see by comparing the polar cases of Germany on one hand and Portugal on the
other hand. Indeed, if one looks at the response of real compensation, there is no evidence
from the models that the wage bargaining framework works more smoothly in the former
country. Both consumer and producer real wages remain persistently above the baseline
notwithstanding the contraction in output and the ensuing rise in the unemployment rate,
while in the latter country the fall in real wages begins only a few quarters after the policy
tightening. Though somewhat surprising, the evidence for Germany may reflect a large
degree of nominal inertia, which dominates the downward impulse on wages engendered by
labour market slackness. Any presumption that goods markets are more flexible in Germany
than in Portugal is also not supported. Indeed, the mark-up falls more in the latter than in the
former country.
What could instead account for the unfavourable inflation-unemployment trade-off
may be the adjustment of labour demand. Average productivity turns out to be much more
procyclical in the periphery than in the core, implying that the extent of labour hoarding is
much larger within the first set of countries, possibly because of more stringent hiring and
firing restrictions or because of the large share of self-employed workers. A low output
elasticity of employment tends to dampen fluctuations in marginal costs and hence to reduce
the incentives for firms to set new prices, which in turn shifts the burden of adjustment on
real variables. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence presented in OECD (1999),
which reports that Southern Europe is characterised by a more stringent employment
protection legislation than the rest of the continent, though the gap is gradually reducing.
30
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in real variables; Spain, on the contrary, qualifies in all respects as a core country, with smoothly-working
labour and goods markets. In both cases, priors and external evidence seem to be somewhat at odds with the
picture which is drawn from the results of the WGEM experiment.
30 See OECD (1999), page 66.53
In addition. demand factors appear to have some importance: in both Portugal and
Greece, consumer spending is quite sensitive to changes in the real rate of interest and the
effects of the monetary policy tightening persist even after the initial shock has been
reversed. Similar considerations apply also to Austria, another country in which the
dominant channel in monetary policy transmission is intertemporal substitution in
consumption. With regard to this high interest-rate elasticity of households’ spending, some
role might be played by the interaction of capital market imperfections and precautionary
saving.
31
There is less support for the existence of marked asymmetries between euro area
countries when the sacrifice ratio
32 is used to gauge the cost of disinflating, as shown in
Figure 8.2. Only Austria and, to a lesser extent, Greece clearly stand out as the countries in
which the unemployment loss required to curb inflationary pressures is higher, but for the
other countries, Portugal included, the existing differences do not seem to be dramatic.
                                                          
31 In principle, one would expect that liquidity constraints affect consumption by increasing the sensitivity
to changes in disposable income and by reducing interest rate elasticity. However, the reverse could also
happen. Indeed, if individuals face a limit to the amount they can borrow and such limit is not fixed but
depends on collateral or income prospects, households which are net borrowers could be forced to revise their
expenditure plans when the monetary policy stance changes. Liquidity constraints could also interact with
prudence, since the inability to borrow when financing conditions deteriorate is an additional reason to
accumulate precautionary balances, which could induce some spurious correlation between interest rate and
consumption if the precautionary motive is not properly accounted for in the econometric specification of
household spending. The latter factor could also contribute to explain why consumption does not rebound when
the monetary policy tightening ceases.
32 There is no an unambiguous way to compute the sacrifice ratio. Cecchetti and Rich (1999), for instance,
use the ratio of the long-run response to a monetary policy shock of the level of log-output to the long-run
response of the level of inflation, which requires an assumption that both variables are unit-root processes. In
our experiment, the level on inflation is in general not permanently affected by a change in the short-term
interest rate and no long-run multipliers are available. As a consequence, attention was focused on the first five
years of the simulation and the following additional assumptions were used: (1) the sacrifice ratio was
computed with reference to domestic channels only; (ii) as a price variable, the GDP deflator was considered;
(iii) the cumulated unemployment loss was computed for the first j* years, where j* is the year in which the
unemployment rate reaches a peak; (iv) the cumulated reduction in inflation is computed for the first k* years,























































In addition, when compared with the BIS results (Figure 8.3), in the majority of cases
the trade-off seems to have evolved in a favourable way in the last few years, possibly as a
consequence of the process of integration which has taken momentum in the last decade and
because of the shift to a more coordinated policy.












This paper has reported the results of a common monetary policy experiment that has
been undertaken using large scale macroeconomic models at the disposal of the ECB and the
NCBs of the Eurosystem. As discussed in the paper, considerable attention has been paid to
undertaking a genuinely comparable experiment that reflects the existence of monetary
union.
On the basis of the results provided a number of conclusions can be drawn. In terms of
the impact of monetary policy on output, a 1 percentage point rise in short-term interest rates
is found to have a maximum aggregate effect in NCBs models of –0.4 per cent after 2 years.56
The maximum aggregate effect on prices is also –0.4 per cent but in this case it occurs 2
years later, reflecting the fact that in most of the models prices react more slowly and largely
in response to changes in economic activity. The dominant channel of transmission in the
first two years – both in terms of its impact on output and on prices – is the exchange rate
channel. However, in terms of the impact on output, from the third year of the simulation
onwards the user cost of capital channel becomes dominant.
Inevitably these aggregate responses mask some notable variations in the results across
models. There are variations with respect to both the magnitude and timing of the effects and
the relative contributions of each of the channels of transmission. The impacts on output and
prices were found to be relatively modest in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg and relatively strong in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Some models also
incorporate special features not included in the other models – for example the P-star effects
included in the German model – which lead to differences in the patterns of adjustment to
the monetary policy experiment. There are also noteworthy differences between the
aggregate results from the NCBs models and the results from the ECBs Area Wide Model.
The latter tends to show more pronounced and prolonged impacts of monetary policy on
economic activity and prices.Tables
Table A.1   Effects on prices
Consumption deflator
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.10 -0.18 -0.21 -0.17 -0.12
Germany -0.05 -0.19 -0.38 -0.56 -0.56
Greece -0.16 -0.24 -0.29 -0.35 -0.38
Spain -0.04 -0.25 -0.46 -0.68 -0.86
France -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.16
Ireland -0.09 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.22
Italy -0.15 -0.33 -0.47 -0.50 -0.37
Luxemburg -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13
Netherlands -0.12 -0.20 -0.22 -0.30 -0.38
Austria -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12
Portugal -0.07 -0.22 -0.26 -0.27 -0.35
Finland -0.53 -0.50 -0.17 -0.02 -0.08
Aggregate -0.09 -0.21 -0.31 -0.40 -0.40
AWM -0.15 -0.30 -0.38 -0.49 -0.66
GDP Deflator
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11
Germany 0.05 -0.14 -0.41 -0.57 -0.53
Greece -0.15 -0.26 -0.35 -0.42 -0.45
Spain -0.02 -0.23 -0.47 -0.72 -0.92
France -0.04 -0.12 -0.18 -0.21 -0.23
Ireland -0.02 -0.12 -0.24 -0.34 -0.40
Italy -0.16 -0.38 -0.53 -0.49 -0.33
Luxemburg -0.08 -0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.15
Netherlands 0.01 -0.20 -0.30 -0.36 -0.39
Austria -0.09 -0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12
Portugal -0.07 -0.25 -0.29 -0.30 -0.39
Finland -0.44 -0.46 -0.15 -0.01 -0.09
Aggregate -0.04 -0.20 -0.35 -0.43 -0.41
AWM -0.10 -0.31 -0.44 -0.57 -0.76Table A.1   Effects on prices (ctd.)
Import deflator
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.51 -0.41 -0.18 -0.11 -0.06
Germany -0.38 -0.27 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09
Greece -0.66 -0.36 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13
Spain -0.51 -0.58 -0.27 -0.12 -0.08
France -0.41 -0.34 -0.18 -0.12 -0.10
Ireland -0.82 -0.56 -0.17 -0.09 -0.06
Italy -0.78 -0.52 -0.36 -0.31 -0.14
Luxemburg -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16
Netherlands -0.71 -0.30 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08
Austria -0.41 -0.22 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
Portugal -0.35 -0.40 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12
Finland -0.74 -0.57 -0.25 -0.16 -0.11
Aggregate -0.51 -0.38 -0.17 -0.14 -0.10
AWM -0.96 -0.67 -0.23 -0.24 -0.35
Export deflator
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.43 -0.34 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05
Germany -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 -0.15 -0.20
Greece -1.20 -0.60 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21
Spain -0.22 -0.30 -0.29 -0.37 -0.45
France -0.26 -0.23 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17
Ireland -1.16 -0.48 0.09 -0.06 -0.16
Italy -0.42 -0.50 -0.52 -0.44 -0.24
Luxemburg -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
Netherlands -0.43 -0.34 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14
Austria -0.28 -0.19 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09
Portugal -0.34 -0.33 -0.21 -0.16 -0.18
Finland -0.73 -0.50 -0.13 -0.03 -0.07
Aggregate -0.27 -0.26 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21
AWM -0.51 -0.62 -0.46 -0.52 -0.70Table A.2   Effects on real activity
Real GDP
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.15 -0.20 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03
Germany -0.28 -0.33 -0.09 0.15 0.26
Greece -0.41 -0.78 -0.69 -0.72 -0.74
Spain -0.12 -0.43 -0.62 -0.56 -0.39
France -0.15 -0.28 -0.25 -0.16 -0.08
Ireland -0.25 -0.48 -0.43 -0.38 -0.32
Italy -0.26 -0.60 -0.55 -0.21 0.05
Luxemburg -0.17 -0.25 -0.27 -0.23 -0.15
Netherlands -0.20 -0.27 -0.25 -0.22 -0.16
Austria -0.25 -0.47 -0.49 -0.36 -0.32
Portugal -0.12 -0.56 -0.81 -0.74 -0.61
Finland -0.34 -0.24 -0.15 -0.22 -0.25
Aggregate -0.22 -0.38 -0.31 -0.14 -0.02
AWM -0.34 -0.71 -0.71 -0.63 -0.57
Real private consumption
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00
Germany -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.11 0.14
Greece -0.44 -0.85 -0.64 -0.52 -0.43
Spain -0.02 -0.21 -0.40 -0.40 -0.37
France -0.18 -0.34 -0.27 -0.17 -0.10
Ireland -0.29 -0.37 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04
Italy -0.15 -0.37 -0.17 0.29 0.51
Luxemburg -0.21 -0.49 -0.63 -0.65 -0.61
Netherlands -0.08 -0.11 -0.18 -0.23 -0.22
Austria -0.11 -0.50 -0.79 -0.76 -0.71
Portugal -0.31 -0.94 -1.34 -1.29 -1.06
Finland -0.23 0.05 0.12 -0.08 -0.21
Aggregate -0.12 -0.23 -0.19 -0.06 0.01
AWM -0.27 -0.58 -0.54 -0.43 -0.37Table A.2   Effects on real activity (ctd.)
Real total investment
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.32 -0.55 -0.15 0.10 0.07
Germany -0.20 -0.29 -0.11 0.09 0.18
Greece -0.35 -1.59 -1.92 -2.27 -2.57
Spain -0.53 -2.00 -2.36 -1.85 -1.16
France -0.10 -0.29 -0.34 -0.27 -0.09
Ireland -0.96 -2.80 -3.55 -3.51 -3.48
Italy -0.53 -2.50 -3.57 -2.21 -0.78
Luxemburg -0.10 -1.41 -2.00 -1.12 -0.63
Netherlands -0.37 -0.86 -1.00 -0.78 -0.42
Austria -0.95 -1.86 -1.42 -0.93 -0.79
Portugal -0.45 -1.89 -2.13 -1.19 -0.85
Finland -1.02 -1.05 -0.63 -0.65 -0.66
Aggregate -0.34 -1.04 -1.22 -0.80 -0.39
AWM -0.81 -2.37 -2.96 -2.63 -2.42
Unemployment rate (% points)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
________ ________ ________ ________ ________
B e l g i u m 0 . 0 20 . 0 60 . 0 60 . 0 30 . 0 2
Germany 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.03
G r e e c e 0 . 1 10 . 2 00 . 2 30 . 2 80 . 3 1
S p a i n 0 . 0 60 . 3 10 . 5 20 . 5 20 . 3 8
F r a n c e 0 . 0 20 . 0 70 . 1 10 . 0 80 . 0 4
Ireland 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.15
Italy 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.15
Luxemburg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.08
A u s t r i a 0 . 0 80 . 2 20 . 3 20 . 3 10 . 2 8
Portugal 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.10
Finland 0.17 0.26 0.08 0.05 0.07
Aggregate 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.11
A W M 0 . 1 00 . 3 90 . 5 80 . 6 20 . 5 8Table A.3   Decomposition price effects, including spillovers (% deviations from baseline)
Decomposition consumption deflator 2001
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03
Germany -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
Greece -0.16 -0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.16 0.00
Spain -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
France -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 0.01
Ireland -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.01
Italy -0.15 -0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.00
Luxemburg -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
Netherlands -0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01
Austria -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 0.00
Portugal -0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.00
Finland -0.53 -0.41 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.53 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.00
  
AWM -0.15 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.18 0.03
  
Decomposition consumption deflator 2002
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.18 -0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 -0.05
Germany -0.19 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.19 0.00
Greece -0.24 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.24 0.00
Spain -0.25 -0.17 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.25 0.00
France -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 0.00
Ireland -0.15 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.15 0.00
Italy -0.33 -0.20 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.32 -0.01
Luxemburg -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01
Netherlands -0.20 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.20 0.00
Austria -0.14 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.14 0.00
Portugal -0.22 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.23 0.01
Finland -0.50 -0.40 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.50 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.21 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.20 0.00
  
AWM -0.30 -0.18 -0.03 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 -0.34 0.04
  
Decomposition consumption deflator 2003
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.21 -0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.11 -0.16 -0.05
Germany -0.38 -0.13 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.18 -0.03 -0.37 -0.01
Greece -0.29 -0.18 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.29 0.00
Spain -0.46 -0.21 -0.03 -0.16 0.01 -0.07 -0.46 0.00
France -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 0.00
Ireland -0.15 -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01
Italy -0.47 -0.19 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.50 0.03
Luxemburg -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.00
Netherlands -0.22 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.22 0.00
Austria -0.14 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 0.00
Portugal -0.26 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.27 0.01
Finland -0.17 -0.20 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.17 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.31 -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.31 0.00
  
AWM -0.44 -0.12 -0.02 -0.26 0.03 0.00 -0.37 -0.07
  Table A.3   Decomposition price effects, including spillovers (ctd.)
Decomposition consumption deflator 2004
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary  Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.17 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.11 -0.14 -0.03
Germany -0.56 -0.18 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.28 -0.06 -0.55 -0.01
Greece -0.35 -0.19 -0.05 0.00 -0.12 -0.36 0.01
Spain -0.68 -0.20 -0.05 -0.31 0.00 -0.13 -0.69 0.01
France -0.14 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.15 0.01
Ireland -0.17 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.17 0.00
Italy -0.50 -0.17 -0.07 -0.12 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.06 -0.55 0.05
Luxemburg -0.09 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.00
Netherlands -0.30 -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.32 0.02
Austria -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 0.00
Portugal -0.27 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.28 0.01
Finland -0.02 -0.11 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.40 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.41 0.01
  
AWM -0.57 -0.10 -0.01 -0.42 0.04 0.01 -0.48 -0.09
  
Decomposition consumption deflator 2005
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.11 -0.01
Germany -0.56 -0.17 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.29 -0.08 -0.56 0.00
Greece -0.38 -0.18 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 -0.39 0.01
Spain -0.86 -0.20 -0.05 -0.42 0.00 -0.19 -0.86 0.00
France -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.17 0.01
Ireland -0.22 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.23 0.01
Italy -0.37 -0.15 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.08 -0.43 0.06
Luxemburg -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.12 -0.01
Netherlands -0.38 -0.11 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.17 -0.40 0.02
Austria -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 0.00
Portugal -0.35 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 -0.12 -0.34 -0.01
Finland -0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.40 -0.13 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 -0.42 0.01
  
AWM -0.66 -0.11 -0.01 -0.60 0.06 0.01 -0.65 -0.01
  Table A.4   Decomposition real GDP effects, including spillovers
Decomposition real GDP 2001
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.15 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.15 0.00
Germany -0.28 -0.21 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.28 0.00
Greece -0.41 -0.16 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.41 0.00
Spain -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01
France -0.15 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.16 0.01
Ireland -0.25 -0.04 -0.14 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.26 0.01
Italy -0.26 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.28 0.02
Luxemburg -0.17 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.17 0.00
Netherlands -0.20 -0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.19 -0.01
Austria -0.25 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.25 0.00
Portugal -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 0.00
Finland -0.34 -0.15 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.34 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.22 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.23 0.00
  
AWM -0.34 -0.17 -0.09 -0.20 -0.02 -0.05 -0.53 0.19
  
Decomposition real GDP 2002
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.20 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.13 -0.21 0.01
Germany -0.33 -0.24 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.07 -0.33 0.00
Greece -0.78 -0.13 -0.47 -0.09 -0.09 -0.78 0.00
Spain -0.43 -0.13 -0.04 -0.22 0.01 -0.06 -0.44 0.01
France -0.28 -0.03 -0.20 -0.05 0.02 -0.07 -0.33 0.05
Ireland -0.48 -0.08 -0.18 -0.17 0.03 -0.07 -0.47 -0.01
Italy -0.60 -0.10 -0.18 -0.28 0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.67 0.07
Luxemburg -0.25 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.24 -0.01
Netherlands -0.27 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.27 0.00
Austria -0.47 -0.14 -0.12 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.47 0.00
Portugal -0.56 -0.06 -0.34 -0.12 0.06 -0.09 -0.55 -0.01
Finland -0.24 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.23 -0.01
  
Aggregate -0.38 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.41 0.02
  
AWM -0.71 -0.16 -0.03 -0.54 0.05 0.00 -0.68 -0.03
  
Decomposition real GDP 2003
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.12 0.02
Germany -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01
Greece -0.69 -0.04 -0.46 -0.09 -0.11 -0.70 0.01
Spain -0.62 -0.11 -0.05 -0.35 0.00 -0.10 -0.61 -0.01
France -0.25 0.00 -0.15 -0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.27 0.02
Ireland -0.43 -0.10 -0.07 -0.21 0.03 -0.08 -0.43 0.00
Italy -0.55 -0.05 -0.15 -0.38 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.65 0.10
Luxemburg -0.27 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.18 -0.28 0.01
Netherlands -0.25 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.26 0.01
Austria -0.49 -0.07 -0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 -0.12 -0.50 0.01
Portugal -0.81 -0.04 -0.47 -0.20 0.04 -0.14 -0.81 0.00
Finland -0.15 -0.05 0.05 -0.16 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.17 0.02
  
Aggregate -0.31 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.33 0.02
  
AWM -0.71 -0.02 0.08 -0.70 0.11 0.06 -0.47 -0.24
  Table A.4   Decomposition real GDP effects, including spillovers (ctd.)
Decomposition real GDP 2004
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 0.02
Germany 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 -0.05 0.15 0.00
Greece -0.72 -0.02 -0.50 -0.08 -0.12 -0.72 0.00
Spain -0.56 -0.07 -0.02 -0.34 -0.01 -0.12 -0.56 0.00
France -0.16 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.19 0.03
Ireland -0.38 -0.12 0.00 -0.20 0.02 -0.07 -0.37 -0.01
Italy -0.21 -0.01 -0.05 -0.33 0.17 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.24 0.03
Luxemburg -0.23 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.24 0.01
Netherlands -0.22 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.21 -0.01
Austria -0.36 0.01 -0.19 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.10 -0.38 0.02
Portugal -0.74 -0.01 -0.40 -0.16 -0.03 -0.14 -0.74 0.00
Finland -0.22 -0.04 0.02 -0.20 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.23 0.01
  
Aggregate -0.14 0.00 -0.04 -0.11 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.15 0.01
  
AWM -0.63 -0.01 0.05 -0.70 0.07 0.02 -0.57 -0.06
  
Decomposition real GDP 2005
Total Exchange Substitu- Cost of  Income Wealth Monetary Expec- Spillover Sum Discre-
effect rate tion capital channel tations pancy
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
Belgium -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.02
Germany 0.26 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.25 0.01
Greece -0.74 -0.01 -0.55 -0.08 -0.10 -0.74 0.00
Spain -0.39 -0.02 0.01 -0.26 -0.01 -0.11 -0.39 0.00
France -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 0.02
Ireland -0.32 -0.11 0.02 -0.18 0.00 -0.05 -0.32 0.00
Italy 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.25 0.17 0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.04
Luxemburg -0.15 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.15 0.00
Netherlands -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.01
Austria -0.32 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.33 0.01
Portugal -0.61 0.00 -0.32 -0.13 -0.03 -0.13 -0.61 0.00
Finland -0.25 -0.02 0.00 -0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.25 0.00
  
Aggregate -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
  
AWM -0.57 0.00 0.02 -0.68 0.05 0.01 -0.60 0.03
  Table A.5.1   Effect on real GDP: exchange rate channel BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) -0.09 -0.24 -0.22 -0.08 0.03
- WGEM (2001) -0.21 -0.24 -0.08 0.05 0.09
France
- BIS (1995) -0.09 -0.21 -0.14 -0.01 0.04
- WGEM (2001) -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01
Italy
- BIS (1995) -0.21 -0.24 0.02 0.05 -0.02
- WGEM (2001) -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 0.04
Spain
- BIS (1995) -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.03
- WGEM (2001) -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 -0.02
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Belgium
- BIS (1995) -0.05 -0.12 -0.13 -0.08 0.03
- WGEM (2001) -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07
Austria
- BIS (1995) -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.00Table A.5.2  Effect on real GDP: direct substitution channel BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) -0.06 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05
- WGEM (2001) -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01
France
- BIS (1995) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
- WGEM (2001) -0.10 -0.20 -0.15 -0.07 -0.02
Italy
- BIS (1995) -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.03
- WGEM (2001) -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02
Spain
- BIS (1995) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.01
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00
- WGEM (2001) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Belgium
- BIS (1995) -0.02 -0.14 -0.21 -0.11 0.01
- WGEM (2001) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Austria
- BIS (1995) -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
- WGEM (2001) -0.03 -0.12 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17Table A.5.3  Effect on real GDP: cost-of-capital channel BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
France
- BIS (1995) -0.13 -0.17 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
- WGEM (2001) -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
Italy
- BIS (1995) -0.06 -0.21 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30
- WGEM (2001) -0.14 -0.40 -0.47 -0.33 -0.21
Spain
- BIS (1995) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09
- WGEM (2001) -0.05 -0.22 -0.35 -0.34 -0.26
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05
Belgium
- BIS (1995) 0.01 -0.03 -0.14 -0.12 -0.05
- WGEM (2001) -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Austria
- BIS (1995) 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.00
- WGEM (2001) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01Table A.5.4  Effect on real GDP: income/cash flow channel BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04
- WGEM (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
France
- BIS (1995) 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.01
- WGEM (2001) 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03
Italy
- BIS (1995) -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.19 0.20
- WGEM (2001) 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.17
Spain
- BIS (1995) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
- WGEM (2001) 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02
- WGEM (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Belgium
- BIS (1995) 0.01 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.07
- WGEM (2001) -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.04
Austria
- BIS (1995) 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
- WGEM (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Table A.5.5  Effect on real GDP: wealth channel BIS (1995) versus WGEM (2001)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Germany
- BIS (1995) - - - - -
- WGEM (2001) - - - - -
France
- BIS (1995) - - - - -
- WGEM (2001) - - - - -
Italy
- BIS (1995) - - - - -
- WGEM (2001) -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.07
Spain
- BIS (1995) -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.02
- WGEM (2001) - - - - -
Netherlands
- BIS (1995) -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01
- WGEM (2001) 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Belgium
- BIS (1995) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04
- WGEM (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria
- BIS (1995) 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
- WGEM (2001) -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08References
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